

#### **Business from technology**

## OPC and MES Day Finland 2014 7 October 2014

**OPC UA Security Evaluation** 

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## 1.MY PAST WORK IN FINLAND: Improving Industrial Cyber Security & Continuity

✓ Approach 2008 - 2016

2.TODAY's TOPIC: OPC UA Security Evaluation

- ✓ Basics
- ✓ CASE: UA Binary Stack Fuzz testing
- 3.CURRENT WORK: KYBER-TEO "Improving cyber security for industry" Total project (2014-2016)
  - ✓ One-slide intro only



## 1.Improving Industrial Cyber Security

Our approach & past national projects

"to industrial cyber security"



# Our Approach to Industrial Cyber Security (Including usage of OPC UA)

Year	Main Idea / Task	Project		
2008-2009	1. FIND THE AREAS:  - What are the main problems?	TITAN "Data Security for Industrial Automation"		
2009-2010	2. STUDY BASICS:  -Analyse the Existing Guidelines	TITAN "Data Security for Industrial Automation"		
2011-2012	3. OPEN THEMES:  -Theme Workshops	TEO-TT "Development of industrial cyber security in national theme workshops"		
2011-2012	4. PROCUREMENT:  -Common Reqs & Instructions	COREQ-VE "Common REQuirements for VEndors"		
2012-2013	5.COMPANY CASES:  -Help at the companies	COREQ-ACT "Active industrial cases for information security"		
2014-2016	6.MORE COMPANY CASES:  -Help in 3 WPs	KYBER-TEO "Improving cyber security for industry"		

Security act

Objective

Number Class

Responsible Additional requirements



Implementation example

## **Our Approach to Industrial Cyber Security**

Requirement

OPC UA Hardening Guide
Example

4. PROCUREMENT:

-Common Reqs & Instructions

Requirement
Base

#### COREQ-VE: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION VENDOR MANAGEMENT:

**Importance** 

Number	Class	Objective	Security act	G = Gen. M = O&M P = Project	1 = Minimum 2 = Option 3 = Advanced 4 = N/A (Out)	Requirement	V=Vendor P=Principal Other=?	Additional requirements	implementation example
1	Hardening	Hardened systems & applications	Project specific hardening guide		<b>♠</b> 1	Vendor's hardening guide shall include: a) software and functionality to be removed, b) protection of diagnostic and configuration ports, c) disabling all unused ports on switches and routers, d) maintenance process to hardened system	V+P	The vendor shall provide an up-to-date list of platform software, licences, applications and protocols required by the system operation. If possible, use only one version of each protocol	Must find an acceptable minimum configuration for each and every device, harden according to guide, verify and apply "hardened" marking to documentation
2	Hardening	Reduced data flows	Documented data flows	Р	<b>1</b>	Vendor shall document all data flows and storage points with identification of sensitive information	V+P	For multivendor environments, the vendor shall provide a detailed system integration guide with interface descriptions	Data flow: Source address, destination address, protocol, port, purpose/application, etc.
3	Network segmentation	Separated ICS networks	Define segmentation architecture	P	會1	Vendor shall document the segmentation architecture between operative ICS and other domains	V+P	The vendor shall document in detail the used data flows between segments (and between security zones)	Critical vendor- or functional networks inside control system domain shall also be assigned to separate segments and subnetworks
4	Data safekeeping	Planned data safekeeping	Documented system data safekeeping	Р	<b>≥</b> 2	Vendor shall document their systems' data safekeeping capability (incl. data reduction, timeouts, data purging etc.)	V		System data safekeeping functions are typically system specific and must comply with the Principal's requirements








#### **WARNING:**

I BELIEVE, WE ARE NOT EVALUATING & TESTING INDUSTRIAL DATA COMMUNICATION ENOUGH TODAY!











#### Technological Threats

✓ Vulnerabilities in systems & networks


#### Reasons:

- a) Increased TCP/IP Internet type of Risks!
- b) Increased dependency on networks (e.g. due to Certificates)
- Protocol based attacks against UA XML –
   which may be vulnerable (attack tools exist)
   → Insertion of COMMANDS!
- d) System update and maintenance challenges due to long life cycle of applications






## Before test runs: <u>Agree</u> about the SYSTEM features to be tested!








#### **Focus on Test Goals**







#### **OPC UA Connection Security**





Reference/Figure: <a href="http://www.prosys.fi">http://www.prosys.fi</a>





#### **OPC UA Authentication & Security Modes**





- New policies can be defined

Client application defines the used security mode

Reference/Figure: http://www.prosys.fi



### **Include PKI Certificate Mgmt testing?**

-Example: GDS-

GDS as OPC UA wrapper around any directory or CA

GDS Services as test target?


### OPC UA Discovery options

- ✓ Discover on known port 4840 of a network node
- Use mDNS for ad-hoc discovery in local network
- Use GDS as central discovery server:
  - □ RequestCertificate
  - □ SignCertificate
  - □ RenewCertificate□ CheckRequestStatus
  - □ GetTrustList

All OPC UA applications to use Certificate trust list

X.509 based
Certificate
management (PKI)
messaging
Using HTTPS

Using HTTPS
Certificates for the mgmt messaging




REF: https://opcfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/12\_UA\_Discovery.pdf




# **OPC UA Protocols -Binary stack testing-**

NOTE: OPC UA Security testing tools are under development right now!






# Set Up and Configure the Test System -OPC UA Binary Stack-




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





















Codenomicon Defensics: Traffic Capture Fuzzer (TCF) Tool



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# OPC UA Protocols -Hybrid stack testing-



Layer figure is from: http://www.ascolab.com/en/technology-unified-architecture.html





#### Main challenges in OPC UA System's Security Protection:

- Management of <u>OPC UA Systems & Configurations</u>
- Establishment of OPC UA Vendors' security evaluation activities
- System & Communication security E.g. <u>OPC UA Certificate</u> <u>management!</u>
- Etc.

06/10/2014





### 2.TODAY's TOPIC: OPC UA Security Evaluation

#### Technological PROTECTION

#### ENSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF KEYS

- ✓ Planning for long PKI Certificate life-cycles
- ✓ PKI Certificate management systems
- ✓ PKI Certificate maintenance processes

#### SECURE THE ACCESS TO OPC UA SYSTEMS

- ✓ Layered Defense: Frontend FW + Backend FW + Segments
- ✓ Separate: Mgt. Access / Security services maintenance / Data access
- ✓ Secure Gateway solutions (OPC UA Gateway), Monitoring
- ✓ VPN tunneling of OPC UA connections
- ✓ External Audits!

06/10/2014



## 3. KYBER-TEO Project "Improving cyber security for industry" (2014-2016)

Part of Implementing the national Cyber Security strategy 2014-2016 (see: <a href="http://www.turvallisuuskomitea.fi">http://www.turvallisuuskomitea.fi</a>)



## KYBER-TEO "Improving cyber security for industry" (National NESA program 2014 - 2016)

Developing and testing <u>SERVICES</u> in the participating companies to ensure the cyber security and continuity of Finnish industrial production

- WP 1: Cyber security practices and mappings
- WP 2: Deploying the cyber security to industrial production
- WP 3: Cyber security monitoring services for automation networks

**GOAL**: To disseminate results and experiences between companies.

#### Focus on co-operation

- Participating companies
  - √ Company specific cases
  - √ Project work (technology, services)
- Other industrial companies (e.g. through dedicated NESA HUOVI-portal project area)
  - ✓ Wide company reviews
  - ✓ Result dissemination seminars
- State authority & Research co-operation: (Advice, quality, development, dissemination, education)
  - √ National Emergency Supply Agency (Project owner)
  - √ VTT (Project lead & execution)
  - ✓ TUT Tampere University of Technology (Project subcontractor)
  - √ Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)

#### **Detail Information & participation to KYBER-TEO project, please contact:**

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06/10/2014



#### **Contact point**

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